s financial market complexity and borrower diversity have grown over time, investors and regulators have increased their reliance on the opinions of A the credit rating agencies. At the same time, the number of rating agencies operating in the United States and abroad has risen sharply. Together, these trends have prompted market participants and policymakers to assess the performance of the agencies and the adequacy of public oversight of the ratings industry.
mercantile credit agencies, which rated merchants' ability to pay their financial obligations. In 1841, in the wake of the financial crisis of 1837, Louis Tappan established the first mercantile credlt agency in New York. Robert Dun subsequently acquired the agency, which published its first ratings guide in 1859. A similar mercantile rating agency was formed in 1849 by John Bradstreet, who published a ratings bdok in 1857. In 1933, the two agencies were consolidated into Dun and Bradstreet, which became the owner of Moody's Investors Service in 1962.
The expansion of the ratings business to securities ratings began in 1909 when John Moody started to rate U.S. railroad bonds. A year later, Moody extended his ratings activity to utility and industrial bonds. The most significant new entry in the United States since that time has been the Chicago-based Duff & Phelps, which began to provide bond ratings for a wide range of companies in 1982, although it had researched public utility companies since 1932. Another major ratings provider -McCarthy, Crisanti, and Maffei -was founded in 1975 and acquired by Xerox Financial Services before its fixed-income rating and research service was merged into Duff & Phelps in 1991.
The four major rating agencies face competition from more specidzed agencies. For example, Thomson Bankwatch and IBCA in the United States rate financial institutions exclusively, and A.M. Best rates insurance companies' claims-paying abilities.
Analysts employed by many financial institutions regularly make recommendations to buy or sell that implicitly confirm or contradict the agencies' ratings. To the extent that the analyses underlylng these recommendations are made public, they provide alternative perspectives to the judgments of the rating agencies.
As capital flows in international financial markets have shifted from the banking sector to capital markets, credit ratings have also begun to make a mark overseas. Credit ratings are in use in the financial markets of most developed economies and several emerging market countries as well (see Dale and Thomas [1991] ).
With demand rising in foreign countries, the number of foreign-based rating agencies has increased.
Along with the four largest U.S. raters, one other U.S., one British, two Canadian, and three Japanese firms are listed among the world's "most influential" rating agencies by the Financial Times in its publication, Credit Ratings International. The principal characteristics of all eleven agencies are reported in Exhibit 1.
The ownership structures of the U.S. rating agencies do not generally present serious conflict of interest problems.' The major agencies are all either independent or owned by non-financial companies, although two until recently were owned by financial companies. Moody's is a subsidiary of Dun and Bradstreet, which dominates the market for commercial credlt ratings. Standard & Poor's is a subsidlary of McGraw-Hill, a major publishing company with a strong business information focus. Fitch, initially a publishing company, was bought by an independent investors group in 1989.
Duff & Phelps Credit Ratings is a subsidiary of Duff & Phelps, Inc., whose affiliates offer investment management, financial consulting, and investment research services. By late 1994, however, Duff & Phelps Credit Ratings is expected to become an independent company as its shares are spun off to the shareholders of Duff & Phelps, Inc., itself a closely held company. Thomson Bankwatch was a subsidiary of Keefe, Bruyette, and Woods, a brokerage firm, untd March 1989, when it was sold to the Thomson Corporation, a large private international publishing conglomerate.
Most of the non-U.S. firms are also independent. The London-based rating agency, IBCA, is independently owned, as are the two Canadian rating agencies. Two of the rating agencies from Japan, however, are owned by consortiums of financial institutions, including some for which credit ratings are issued.
Over time, the agencies have expanded the depth and frequency of their coverage. The four leading U.S. credlt rating agencies rate not only the longterm bonds issued by U.S. corporations, but also a wide variety of other debt instruments: municipal bonds, asset-backed securities, preferred stocks, medium-term note programs, shelf registrations, private placements, commercial paper programs, and bank certificates of deposit. More recently, ratings have been applied to other types of risks, includlng the counterparty risk posed by derivative products companies and other ins,titutions, the claims-paying ability of insurance companies, the performance risk of mortgage servicers, and the price volatdity of mutual funds and The bond ratings assigned by all the rating agencies are meant to indicate the likelihood of default or delayed payment of the security. Most of the rating agencies have long had their own system of symbolssome using letters, others using numbers, many bothfor ranlung the risk of default from extremely safe to highly speculative. Gradually, however, a rough correspondence among the major agencies' ratings has emerged (Exhibit 2 
The Transition to Charging Issuers and the Role of Reputation
Agencies initially provided public ratings of an issuer free of charge, and financed their operations solely through the sale of publications and related materials. The publications, which are easily copied once published, however, did not yield sufficient returns to justifjr intensive coverage. As the demand on rating agencies for faster and more comprehensive service increased, agencies began to charge issuers for ratings. They then used these revenues to expand services and products and to compete with private-sector analysts at other financial institutions.
The default of Penn Central on $82 million of commercial paper in 1970 was a catalyst in the transition to charging issuers. As the commercial paper market grew very rapidly in the 1960s, with little regard for credit quality, investors tended to assume that any firm with a household name was an acceptable credt risk. When Penn Central defaulted during the 1970 recession, however, investors began to question the financial condition of many companies and refused to roll over their commercial paper. Facing a liquidty crisis, many of these companies also defaulted.
To reassure nervous investors, issuers actively (Ederington and Yawitz [ 19871) .
Agencies charge fees that vary with the size and type of issue, but a representative fee on a new longterm corporate bond issue ranges from 2 to 3 basis points of the principal for each year the rating is maintained. Normally, the charge for any one bond issue has both a floor and a ceiling, and negotiated rates are available for frequent issuers. For issuers of commercial paper, Moody's and Standard & Poor's maintain quarterly charges based on amounts outstanding (up to 7 basis points) plus an annual fee.
While the current payment structure may appear to encourage agencies to assign higher ratings to satisfjr issuers, the agencies also have an overriding incentive to maintain a reputation for high-quality, accurate ratings. If investors were to lose confidence in an agency's ratings, issuers would no longer believe they could lower their funding costs by obtaining its ratings. and -) and CBRS (H and L symbols in place of + and -, and + symbols that correspond to second and third letters). The agencies follow a variety of policies with respect to the number of ratings symbols given below B-.
As one industry observer puts it, "every time a rating is assigned, the agency's name, integrity, and credibllity are on the line and subject to inspection by the whole investment community" (Wilson [1994] ). Over the years, the discipline provided by reputational considerations appears to have been effective, with no major scandals in the ratings industry of which we are aware.3
In addition to putting an agency's reputation at risk, inaccurate ratings might expose the agency to costly legal damages. So far, the threat of legal liability for rating agencies has not yet materialized. Class action suits have been brought against rating agencies following major fdures -such as the Washington Public Power Supply System default in 1983 and the Executive Life bankruptcy in 1991 -but the cases were dropped before verdlcts were reached.
The Ratings Process and Unsolicited Ratings
Agencies base their ratings on both quantitative and qualitative assessment of the borrowing company's condition and special provisions of the particular security at hand. The process of obtaining a rating can be lengthy, requiring significant time and effort on the part of the debt issuer and its underwriter as well as the agency.
A staff committee at the agency usually votes on a recommendation by a senior analyst after presentation and debate. The rating assigned, often accompanied by explanatory analysis, is first communicated to the issuer and underwriter, and then to the public at large.
The issuer frequently has the opportunity to appeal a rating if it is not satisfied, but in general the ratings process is structured to hear the best case the issuers have to present before the rating is assigned. (More dlscussion of the information gathering and decision process can be found in Wilson [1994] and Ederington and Yawitz [ 19871 .) The agencies maintain very different policies about assigning ratings not requested by the issuer. Some agencies will issue ratings only upon request; other agencies will issue unsolicited ratings.
Standard & Poor's rates all taxable securities in the US. domestic market registered by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), regardless of whether the rating is requested and paid for by the issuer. Standard & Poor's will not, however, assign unsolicited ratings for structured securities and bonds issued by foreign companies, because it views the nonpublic information provided by the issuer to be essential for analyzing these securities. Moody's shares Standard & Poor's policy of rating all SEC-registered, U.S. corporate securities, but it frequently issues unsolicited ratings on structured securities and foreign bonds as well. In contrast, both Fitch and Duff & Phelps refrain from assipng unsolicited ratings on any security. Moreover, Duff & Phelps will make a rating public only upon the request of its client (Ederington and Yawitz [ 19871) .
Moody's and Standard & Poor's usually receive fees for ratings they would have issued anyway because companies want the opportunity provided by the formal ratings process to put their best case before the agencies. Moody's unsolicited ratings of issuers of structured securities and foreign bonds are more controversial because such assessments are not part of an overall policy to rate all such securities. Unsolicited ratings in these areas are often substantially lower than the solicited ratings and can affect the yeld paid at issuance.
Proponents claim that unsolicited ratings provide a powerful check against rating shopping, the practice of hiring only those agencies that offer favorable ratings. Critics complain that unsolicited ratings are based on incomplete information, because communication with the issuer is limited. Although an agency assigning unsolicited ratings may appear to have an incentive to be unduly conservative so as to reward those firms that do pay for its ratings, this incentive may be offset by the need to maintain a reputation for analytical credibility (Monro-Davis [1994] ).
Introduced as guides for unsophisticated investors, credit ratings have acquired several new uses. Many mutual funds and pension funds place limits on the amount of a portfolio that can be invested in noninvestment-grade securities. Debt issuers and investors frequently introduce ratings explicitly into the covenants of their financial contracts, and seek guidance from the agencies on the structuring of their financial transactions.
As ratings have gained greater acceptance in the marketplace, regulators of financial markets and institutions have increasingly used ratings to simplify the task of prudential oversight. The reliance on ratings extends to virtually all financial regulators, including the public authorities that oversee banks, thrifts, insurance compa- nies, securities firms, capital markets, mutual funds, and private pensions.
T h e early regulatory uses of ratings drew only o n the agency dstinctions between investment-grade securities o r those rated BBB and above, and speculative securities, those rated BB and below. Regulations required that extra capital be held against speculative securities o r prohbited such investments altogether.
Although the distinction between investmentgrade and speculative securities remains an important one, over time, regulatory capital requirements, disclosure requirements, and investment prohibitions have increasingly been tied to other letter grades as well. The history of selected uses of ratings by regulators is summarized in Exhibit 3. 4 Since regulators adopted ratings-dependent rules, they have had to specify which agencies quahfy for consideration under their regulations. The SEC currently designates six agencies as "nationally recognized statistical rating organizations" (NRSROs), and the other regulators generally rely on the SECS designations.
Given the large number of designated agencies (and at least as many agencies have applications pending), regulations must include methods for dealing with rating disagreements among the agencies. Most regulations simply accept either the highest rating or the second-highest rating, but the insurance regulators conduct independent analyses to resolve disagreements among the agencies. The first approach is arbitrary and perhaps inflationary, while the second approach incurs the cost of establishing in-house analytical capacity.
Traditional Use of Ratings: Distinguishing Investment-Grade From Speculative Securities
On the heels of a sharp decline in credit quality in 1931, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ruled that bank holdngs of publicly rated bonds had to be rated BBB or better by at least one rating agency if they were to be carried at book value; otherwise the bonds were to be written down to market value, and 50% of the resulting book losses were to be charged against capital. Similar rules were adopted by many state banking departments.
In 1936, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve went farther, prohibiting banks altogether from holding bonds not rated BBB or above by at least two agencies. The new rules had far-reaching consequences because 891 of 1,975 bonds listed on the New York Stock Exchange were rated below BBB in 1936. Still in force for banks today, these restrictions on investment were extended to thrifts in 1989.
As of the early 1930s, regulators of insurance companies were relying on ratings to help determine the capital to be put aside for securities held. In 1951, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) established a system of internal quality categories in which the top-quality classification corresponded to ratings of BBB and above, effectively establishing uniformity in the definition of "investment-grade" across bank and insurance regulators (West [ 1973] ). ' Regulatory rules based on the distinction between investment-grade and speculative securities have since expanded. The SEC has required dealers to hold extra capital against their inventories of speculative or "junk" bonds since 1975. In 1989, Congress passed legislation prohbiting thrifis from investing in junk bonds. In 1993, the Bade Committee on Bank Supervision proposed in its market risk guidelines that internationally active commercial banks dealing in securities should hold extra capital against their noninvestment-grade bond inventories as well. (This passage in the proposal mirrors a similar statement in the European Community's capital adequacy directive governing the activities of security dealers domiciled in the The achievement of an investment-grade rating eases the burden of disclosure for the issuer of the securities. In 1982, the SEC started to require less detailed disclosure at issuance for investment-grade securities. In 1993, the SEC adopted Rule 3a-7, which made the investment-grade rating a criterion for easing the public issuance of certain asset-backed securities (see Cantor and Demsetz [1993] ).
Embedding the investment-grade dstinction in regulations has simplified prudential oversight of financial institutions. Some of these regulations have, as a byproduct, adversely affected the availability and cost of funds to below-investment-grade borrowers. West [1973] and Carey et al. [1993] show that spreads rose for borrowers rated BB following the adoption of regulations affecting bank and insurance company investments in below-investment-grade securities.
Community.)

The Emergence of New Cutoff Ratings
Regulators are increasingly using ratings other than BBB as thresholds in their rules. Each new regulatory use appears to have encouraged other regulators to expand their reliance on ratings. Some of these new rules have greatly influenced the development of capital markets.
In 1984, to promote the development of a mortgage-backed securities market without the support of government-related agencies (Government National Mortgage Association, Federal National Mortgage Association, and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation), Congress passed the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act ( S W A ) . This act eased issuance and enhanced the marketability of mortgagebacked securities rated AAA or AA. In particular, it allows these securities to be marketed up to six months in advance of the delivery of their underlying collateral and exempts them from most states' blue sky laws.
In addition to essentially creating the non-agency mortgage-backed securities market, SMMEA established a new regulatory cutoff rating. The higher AA rating was chosen because mortgage-backed securities with full or partial government backing -the reference securities to whch the new securities are comparedwere virtually all rated AAA or AA at the time.
A few years later, the Federal Reserve Board, which had previously refrained from expanding its use of ratings beyond the basic investment-grade requirements for bank portfolio investments, also began to incorporate an AA cutoff in certain of its prudential rules affecting bank supervision. In recognition of the expanded role given to ratings by the Congress, the Board began to use AA as a cutoff in rules for determining the eligibility of mortgage-related securities (1987) and foreign bonds (1989) as collateral for margin lending6
The single-A rating has also served as a cutoff. The Labor Department, in its role as overseer of the private pension industry, adopted a regulation in 1988 permitting pension fund investments in asset-backed securities rated single-A or better (Baron and Murch [1993] ). The A rating gained further regulatory importance in 1990 when the NAIC adopted new capital rules that apply the least burdensome capital charge to bonds with the NAIC quahty designation corresponding to a public rating of A or above.
Short-term ratings too have been important tools of recent regulation. In 1991, the SEC adopted amendments to Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 that impose ratings-based restrictions on money market mutual fund investments.' Following the adoption of these amendments, mutual h n d holdngs of lower-quality paper fell to zero, and the total amount of lower-quality paper outstanding declined sharply (Crabbe and Post [1992] ).
Some regulations have gone beyond specific cutoff levels by incorporating schedules of multiple rating levels and corresponding restrictions and charges. As part of its 1990 reform of rating procedures, the NAIC increased the number of its quality categories from four to six, and applied different regulatory restrictions to each category. Four years later, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council [1994] joined bank and thrift regulators, includmg the Federal Reserve, in a proposal to adjust capital charges on depository institutions' holdngs of structured securities on the basic of credit ratings.
The Designation of NRSROs
Under most current ratings-dependent regulations in the United States, ratings matter only if they are issued by an NRSRO. The SEC first applied the NRSRO designations to agencies in 1975 in referring to agencies whose credit ratings could be used to determine net capital requirements for broker-dealers. Subsequently, the term was taken up by regulators other than the SEC and even by the private investment community.
When the phrase NRSRO was first used, the SEC was referring to the three agencies that had a national presence at that time, Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch. But as the public bond market and the rating industry grew over time, other agencies have sought NRSRO designation from the SEC.
In At present, the SEC's procedures and conditions for designating agencies as NRSROs are not very explicit. If a rating agency requests NRSRO status from the SEC, the SEC's staff wdl undertake an investigation, analyzing data supplied by the rating agency about its history, ownership, employees, financial resources, policies, and internal procedures. The principal test applied by the SEC to any agency seeking NRSRO status is that the agency be "nationally recognized by the predominant users of ratings in the United States as an issuer of credble and reliable ratings" (SEC [1994a] ).
In effect, the SEC requires that the market already place substantial weight on the judgment of a rating agency. Market acceptance is determined by poUlng on an informal basis. By giving the market a role in selecting NRSROs, the SEC intends to weed out agencies that have not already established a reputation for accurate ratings.
Nonetheless, the informality of the process and the opaqueness of the acceptance criteria raise serious problems. The requirement that an agency be widely used by major investors before it can be designated as an NRSRO clearly favors incumbents. Given the growing importance of NRSRO status, new entrants in the ratings business who lack this status may find it increasingly difficult to attract a wide following in the investment community. These concerns may become more acute as the SEC considers applications from foreign rating agencies.
At present, the SEC does not require NRSROs to have uniform rating standards. In particular, the Commission has no explicit rule that "equivalent" letter grades must correspond to similar expected default rates. Nonetheless, regulations generally refer directly to NRSRO rating levels without allowances for differences across agencies.* Unless the way in which regulations use ratings is changed, all NRSRO ratings of a certain level ought to correspond to the same level of credit risk. To achieve such consistency, the SEC may have to develop additional acceptance criteria and ongoing monitoring capacity.
In recognition of these concerns, the SEC has published a "concept release'' that invites rating agencies, corporations, and investors to comment on "the role of ratings in federal securities laws and the need to establish formal procedures for designating and monitoring the activities of NRSROs" (SEC [1994] ).
Resolving Disagreements Among the Rating Agencies
Most ratings-dependent regulations require only that a bond issue carry a single NRSRO's rating, but issuers in the United States commonly obtain at least two ratings on publicly issued securities. Since both Moody's and Standard & Poor's rate virtually all public corporate bond issues, a dual rating is fairly automatic. As a consequence, differences of opinion across the rating agencies inevitably arise. Regulators have had to find a way to resolve these differences because most of their rules key off specific letter grades. Their approaches to the problem take two forms -explicit rules and independent analysis.
The most common approach is to adopt an explicit rule, recognizing either the highest or the second-highest rating, regardless of the number or level of the other ratings. The second-highest rating rule attempts to strike a balance between a conservative policy (eliminating the highest rating) and a liberal policy (not necessarily using the lowest rating).
When the ratings industry was dominated by Moody's and Standard & Poor's, this rule was effectively conservative, because the lower of two ratings was also the lowest rating. As the number of NRSROs has increased, and issuers have begun to obtain three, four, or more ratings, the policy is potentially more liberal. Although regulators could conceivably adopt a more conservative rule (such as the lowest rating), in areas such as structured finance where Moody's and Standard & Poor's do not attempt to rate every issue, issuers could respond by dropping agencies that assign the lower ratings.
The second approach, used by the NAIC, resolves differences of opinion among the rating agencies through independent analysis. The NAIC's Securities Valuation Office (SVO) assigns each bond held by an insurance company to one of six quality categories, each with a different implication for mandatory reserves. The six quality categories are meant to correspond to different NRSRO public ratings. (Category 1 corresponds to AAA, AA, and A; 2 to BBB; 3 to BB; 4 to B; and 5 or 6 to CCC, C, or D ratings, dependmg on the rating agency.) SVO staff are free to assign a rating that differs from the bond's public credit rating, however, as long as their judgment implies a downgrade from the correspondmg public credit rating.
In practice, the SVO concentrates its resources on 1) determining a quality category for unrated private placement securities, and 2) resolving difKerences of opinion among the agencies, where the SVO may choose either the higher or lower rating (NAIC [1994] ). At the cost of establishing the capacity to undertake independent analysis, the NAIC has developed a clscretionary use of ratings that calls for judgment in the interpretation of split ratings and permits certain ratings to be discounted if they are viewed as too high.
Many of the current uses of ratings presume rating agency accuracy in measurement of both relative and absolute risks of corporate bond defaults. To be meaningful, ratings must, at a minimum, provide a reasonable rank-ordering of relative credit risks. At the same time, however, ratings ought to provide a reliable guide to absolute credt risk. In other words, the ratings levels corresponding to regulatory cutoffs should have a fairly stable relationship to default probabilities over time.
Our review of the corporate bond defaults data assembled by Moody's and Standard & Poor's suggests that the agencies do a reasonable job in assessing relative credlt risks; lower-rated bonds do in fact tend to default more frequently than higher-rated bonds. Agency ratings have been a less reliable guide, however, to absolute credit risks; default probabihties associated with their specific letter ratings have drifted over time.
Our review is limited to the Moody's and This simple association of yields and ratings in and excludes commercial paper ratings, municipal bond the U.S. bond market need not indicate the presence of ratings, or asset-backed bonds. In these other markets, a causal relationship. Rather, it may simply mean that a study of rating reliability is not possible either because both the capital markets and the rating agencies basicaldefaults have been too rare, the data are too hard to ly agree on the factors that measure credit risk. obtain, or the history of the market is too short.
Although the literature is voluminous (see
Measuring Relative
Credit Risks Ederington and Yawitz [1987] ), the evidence is mixed on whether credit ratings contain addtional informaSome very simple tests suggest that the rating industry measures relative credt risks with reasonable accuracy.'The capital markets seem to validate the agencies' judgments by pricing lower-rated bonds at higher average yields. Moreover, both average short-term and long-term default rates are correlated in a sensible way with credit ratings. This evidence implies that ratings tion not already embedded in market yields. Even if ratings do not contain independent information about credit risk, the use of ratings by investors and regulators may make sense if ratings offer an efficient summary of this information.
Measuring ratings performance by contemporaneous market yields, however, does not control for provide a useful rank-ordering of credit risks. These studes indicate that lower corporate bond ratings have indeed been associated with a higher probability of default. The results of the Moody's study (Moody's Investors Service [1994] ) are summarized in Exhibit 5, which reviews the default rates among rated issuers between 1970 and 1993.
The upper left panel presents the one-year default rate for the entire sample of rated bonds.
Measured to one-tenth of a percentage point, the oneyear default rates are zero for all bonds rated A and A above. The one-year default rate rises to two-tenths of BBB a percentage point for BBB issuers, and 1.8 and 8.3% BB 299 for BB and B-rated issuers, respectively. B
The other three panels of Exhibit 5 show how ccc 724 the default probabilities across Moody's rating categories change as the time horizon is lengthened to five, ten, and fifteen years.' While the default probability increases with the time horizon for each rating category, the negative relationship between default probability and rating remains intact. A similar historical default , study (Brand, Kitto, and Bahar [1994] ) covering bonds rated by Standard & Poor's between 1981 and 1993 basically confirms the conclusion drawn from the longer-term study by Moody's. Consistent with the traditional importance of the investment-grade/non-investment-grade distinction, the probability of default rises most dramatically once the investment-grade barrier is breached. In the Moody's study, over a five-year time horizon, the default probability is six times higher for bonds rated BB than for those rated BBB. In contrast, the comparable ratio of default probabilities for B-rated versus BB-rated issues is much lower at 2.2, as is the ratio for BBB-rated versus A-rated issues at 3.2. The same ratios for the Standard & Poor's study are 4.8 (BB versus BBB), 3.0 (BBB versus A), and 1.9 (B versus BB).
Measuring Absolute Credit Risks
The agencies do not intend their ratings to imply precisely the same default probabilities at every time. In particular, they are reluctant to make ratings changes simply on the basis of cyclical considerations, even though the frequency of defaults within rating categories clearly rises in recessions.1° But even if cyclical variabhty in short-term default rates is an inevitable result of a longer-term perspective, long-term default probabilities at the different ratings levels should exhibit relative stability over frequencies longer than the business cycle. In fact, legislators and financial regulators are presuming such a stability when they embed specific credit rating thresholds into law and regulation.
The reliabllity of ratings as predictors of absolute creht risks can be evaluated by examining the default rates associated with different ratings over time, particularly if the time horizon is long enough to incorporate both ends of a business cycle. Using Moody's data between 1970 and 1994, Exhibit 6 reviews the progress of five-year cumulative default rates for investmentgrade and non-investment-grade bonds.
The initial spike in 1970 for non-investmentgrade bonds stems firom the default that year of Penn Central and twenty-six other railroad companies; default rates decreased dramatically the next year. For cohorts established since January 1971, however, the cumulative default rate within all rating classes BBB and below has increased roughly threefold. The 1971 to 1989 increase is fiom 0.4% to 0.8% for A-rated bonds, 1.1% to 3.2% for BBB-rated bonds, 5.1% to 19.7% for BB-rated bonds, and 1 1.1% to 34.3% for B-rated bonds. Five-year default rates now lie well above the highs of 1970.
Although five-year default rates rose during the growth of the junk bond market in the 1980s, deterioration in performance was common to both investment-grade and non-investment-grade samples. The increase in default rates actually began with the 1976, 1977, and 1978 cohorts, whose five-year default rates incorporate defaults that occurred through the end of 1980, 1981, and 1982, respectively. The rising trend in default rates, therefore, was initially related to the early 1980s recession, but continued on through the decade.
In retrospect, the rise in default rates is unsurprising, given the general deterioration i'n credit ratios within rating classes that began in the mid-1980s. Exhibit 7 shows that the median fixed-charge coverage and leverage ratios of industrial firms with BBB, BB, and B credit ratings from Standard & Poor's generally worsened between 1985 and 1991. These data suggest that a relaxation of credit standards may have occurred, perhaps as a result of the view commonly held in the late 1980s that even healthy corporations should increase leverage. l1
Experience since 1970 indicates basically that the correspondence of ratings to default probabilities is subject to substantial change over time. 
IV RATINGS DIFFERENCES ACROSS AGENCIES
Differences among the agencies over specific ratings are common, unavoidable, and even desirable to the extent that disagreements promote better understanding. Nonetheless, these differences can be highly problematic for ratings-based regulation1 when the ratings of any two NRSROs are substitutable.
Some of the observed differences can be attributed to alternative rating methodologies; others are the results of the element ofjudgment in the ratings process. Many of the differences, however, may reflect systematic differences among agencies in the acceptable level of risk in any ratings category. We review some of the basic differences in agency methodologies, average ratings, and rank-orderings of credit risks in the context of three important areas of competition within the industry -ratings for new-issue junk bonds, banks, and asset-backed securities.
Ratings Disagreements Stemming From Alternative Methodologies
Although each agency publishes formal definitions of its various letter ratings, these definitions provide very little insight into the source of agency rating differences. The definitions imply that a different (unquantified) likelihood of default is associated with each letter grade.I2 In addition, rating agencies do not explicitly compare their ratings with those of other agencies.
As a practical matter, however, it appears that market participants have historically viewed the Moody's and Standard & Poor's scales as roughly equivalent, and that the other agencies have attempted to align their scales against those two. But while the relationships among the scales are imprecise, the implicit presumption of ratings-dependent regulation is that the corresponding rating levels of the different NRSROs represent equivalent levels of credit risk and are interchangeable.
Periodically, the rating agencies articulate unique ratings philosophies. For example, although Moody's and Standard & Poor's are primarily concerned with the likehhood of default on interest or principal, Moody's is prepared to give a higher rating to an asset-backed security that is likely to recover most of its principal in the event of default.13 In addition, in the area of rating sovereign credit risks, Moody's is more reluctant to assign a higher rating to a country's domestic currency obligations relative to its foreign currency obligations than is Standard & Poor's (Purcell et al. [1993] ).
The other agencies also differ from their counterparts in certain particulars. For example, unlike other agencies, Duff & Phelps sometimes gives higher ratings for the medium-term notes than for the longer-term securities of the same issuers. And IBCA assigns higher ratings to certain non-U.S. banks than do the U.S. agencies, because it attaches more weight to a foreign government's implicit support of the banking system. Individual agencies often describe the bases for their positions in their documents, but how their methodologies differ from other agencies' generally must be inferred.
Broad Differences Observed in Ratings
Beame and Searle [1992a] summarize the ratings differences observed in a large sample of long-term credit ratings assigned in 1990 by twelve of the leading international rating agencies and recorded by the Financial Times in its quarterly publication, Credit Ratings International. Among the 5,284 rating pairs examined for 1,853 rated borrowers, 44% agree precisely, 35% differ by one rating notch, 14% by two notches, and 6% by three or more notches. (A "rating notch" is, for example, the gap between an A and A+ rating.)
The percentage in agreement is somewhat over- This rough equivalence in the rating standards of Moody's and Standard & Poor's does not seem to extend to other rating agencies. Exhibit 8 compares the ratings given by nine agencies with those given by Moody's to the same borrowers. (Moody's ratings are used as the basis of comparison simply because this agency has the most ratings in the data set.) Three measures of ratings differences are presented: the frequency of agreement, the correlation coefficients, and the average ratings differences.
Standard & Poor's agrees most closely with Moody's (64%), while the percentage agreement varies among the rest to a low of 11% for the Japan Credit Rating Agency. Compared with Standard & Poor's ratings, the ratings of the other agencies exhibit larger average absolute ratings differences and less correlation with Moody's ratings.
These differences in ratings reflect not only &f-ferences in rank-ordering of cre&t risks, but, to a large extent, also differences in rating scales. Notes: Rating notches are gaps between ratings. For exarnple,the gap between A+ and A-is two notches. Average differences are calculated using only the ratings of issuers that were rated by both Moody's and the other agency.
Source: Beattie and Searle [1992a] .
Ratings For New-Issue Junk Bonds
From the point of view of regulatory practice, a rise in the number of rating agencies increases the likelihood that marginal borrowers w d meet minimum ratings thresholds because 1) natural variation in opinion increases the probability of receiving at least one satisfactory rating, and 2) some rating agencies may have higher average rating scales, enabling more borrowers to meet regulatory cutoffs. We can observe the impact of multiple rating agencies on regulatory definitions of investment-grade securities by documenting agency disagreements in the junk bond market.
As generally defined, any issue is considered "junk" that has at least one rating below the BBB-level from either Moody's or Standard & Poor's. After falling off in the early 1990s, junk bond issues reached a new high of $57 billion (18.2%) in 1993 (Fridson [1994] The junk bond sample reveals more strilung differences in agency measurements of absolute and relative credit risks than does the broad sample. Standard & Poor's and Moody's are much more often at odds in the ratings they assign junk bond issuers. If we compare the junk bond ratings in Exhibit 11 with the ratings for the broad sample in Exhibit 8, we find smaller frequencies of agreement and smaller correlation coefficients. The providers of third (and fourth) opinions in this sector, Duff & Phelps and Fitch, also appear to disagree with Moody's with greater regularity and on a greater scale in the junk bond sample.
For the newer rating agencies, many of the observed differences may be related to a difference in their absolute scales in rating credit risks. While 0  116  1989  100  100  21  0  1990  80  80  40  0  5  1990  99  99  72  0  1991  100  100  24  12  42  1991  100  100  21  24  1992  94  97  24  5  233  1992  99  99  28  5  1993  97  98  13  4  301  1993 greatly exceed those reported in Exhibit 8 for the aggregate sample of bond issues. Thus, differences of opinion between the two largest and the smaller agencies appear to be greater for junk bonds than for investment-grade securities. Given the possibilities for split, ratings, the decision to employ a third rating agency is not random. Exhibit 12 relates the frequency with which issuers seek a thrd rating to the ratings received from Moody's and Standard & Poor's. Issuers are more likely to obtain a thrd rating if they receive near-investment-grade or mixed (speculative-grade/investment-grade) ratings from Moody's and Standard & Poor's.
In particular, 46% of the firms with one investment-grade rating from the major two agencies obtained a third opinion. Of these thirty-four firms, twenty-nine obtained a second investment-grade rating. Among issuers that received marginally belowinvestment-grade ratings (BB-ratings) from both Moody's and Standard & Poor's, 26% obtained a third rating. Of these thrty-four firms, sixteen obtained an investment-grade rating.
Our conclusion is that the demand for third ratings increases with the issuer's proximity to investmentgrade, and the opportunity to seek third and fourth ratings has enabled a number of firms to achieve investment-grade status under certain regulations.
International Bank Ratings
As capital markets have become increasingly global, international considerations have assumed greater importance in the ratings industry. U.S. rating agencies have been expancbng their presence overseas, and non-U.S. rating agencies are proliferating.
Credit ratings are particularly important to banks (through counterparty exposure limits, letters of credit, and non-deposit sources of hnds)," and a large number of ratings in the industry are cross-border ratings. In addition, the potential designation of certain foreign agencies as NRSROs may have considerable impact on the activities of foreign banks in the United States. Poor's still rated 57% and 46%, while IBCA was in third position at 31%. While these three leachng agencies rate many banks outside their home countries, most of the other agencies tend to speciahze in ratifigs of banks of their own nationality (see Exhibit 13). Agencies appear to disagree more in their measurement of credit risks for banks than in their risk measurement for other industries. In Exhibit 14, the bank ratings of nine leading rating agencies generally show lower frequencies of agreement and higher absolute ratings Merences relative to Moody's than does the broader ratings sample described in Exhibit 8.19
The differences are greater for the agencies of some countries than for the agencies of others. In particular, the ratings of Japanese agencies differ much more from those of Moody's than do the ratings of other agencies.
What accounts for the wide disagreement? For the U.S. and Canadan agencies, agreement concerning relative risk declines as we move from the broad ratings sample to the bank sample, as evidenced/ by lower correlation coefficients. By contrast, for the Japanese agencies, the wider disagreement reflects higher average rating differentials.
National differences in methodology and approach may also help explain the variation in international bank ratings. For example, the accounting for non-performing loans and reserves is not standardized by country, and opinions vary widely regarding the extent to which particular governments lend implicit support to specific banks in the banking system. Indeed, judgments regardmg controversial issues are related to some degree to the nationality of rating agencies. When raters are from the same country, agreement about the relative ranking of issuers, as measured by the coefficient of correlation, tends to be higher than when they are not.2'
Are observed bank ratings consistent with earlier research concluding that agencies judge issuers from their own country more leniently (Beattie and Searle [1992b] )? When the ratings of all banks evaluated by both home-country and foreign agencies are aggregated, the average home rating exceeds the average foreign rating by one-half of a rating notch.
Results differ greatly depending on the nationality of the bank (Exhibit 15). ratings than foreign ratings, Japanese and U.K. banks receive higher home ratings. At least in this sample, observed differences between home and foreign ratings reflect the relative toughness of each country's agencies rather than a more general home-country bias. Whether the rated bank is from the same country or not does not bear on the differences between the ratings of non-U.S. agencies and Moody's.
International ratings differences are of particular importance at the present time because the SEC is reviewing numerous applications for NRSRO designation from agencies of foreign countries. Differences among the agencies of different countries and the tendency of many agencies to focus on the rating of banks from their home countries imply that if NRSRO status were to be granted to the two Canadian and three Japanese rating agencies, the number of Canadian and Japanese banks reaching regulatory cutoff ratings would increase considerably.
As Exhibit 16 shows, of the fifty-three Canadian banks with senior debt ratings listed in the Financial Times Credit Ratings International [ 19941, the share receiving an NRSRO creht rating of at least AAwould rise from 23% to 55%. Similarly, of the seventyfour Japanese banks with senior debt ratings listed in the same publication, the share receiving an NRSRO rating of at least AA-would rise from 20% to 48%.
Ratings For Mortgage-and Asset-Backed Securities
Competition among the rating agencies is particularly marked in the rating of mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities (MBS and ABS). Source: Financial Times [1994] . increased market share. Banks and securities firms generally consult directly with the rating agencies to find out how MBS and ABS can be structured to obtain high! credit ratings. The agencies analyze the asset pools to be securitized to determine the adequacy of the credit support underlying each tranche of structured transactions. Agency disagreements normally center on the criteria that establish the amount of credit enhancement required for a specific rating. These differences of opinion are not normally evident in the ratings per se because issuers structure their securities to obtain the desired ratings from the agencies they hire. (Moody's occasionally assigns unsolicited ratings that indicate its disagreement with the higher ratings assigned by other agencies.) Market observers have expressed concern that competitive pressures have led agencies to compete on ratings criteria, potentially undermining the reliability of the ratings.22
Industry analysts normally distinguish between two broad categories of MBS, those backed by government agencies such as the Federal National Mortgage Association, and private-label issues that securitize jumbo mortgages, commercial mortgages, and various other so-called non-conforming first mortgages that the government agencies do not securitize. The ABS market securitizes shorter-duration asset pools such as credit card receivables, auto loans, and home equity loans. their unfadarity with the complicated structures of the securities.
The relatively small share of MBS and ABS that are rated less than A consists largely of "B" tranches that are subordinate to much larger, highly rated senior tranches. The subordinated tranches tend to be privately placed and are often rated by just a single agency or carry no rating at all.
MBS and ABS structures typically include credit protection so that the securities are less risky than the underlying asset pools. The forms of the credit enhancements vary widely, and include bank letters of credit, bond insurance company guarantees, subordinated interests, cash collateral accounts, and reinvestment of the excess cash flow generated by the asset pools themselves. Since a l l enhancements are costly, issuers prefer structures that achieve a given rating with the smallest enhancements, and choose rating agencies with the most lenient credit enhancement requirements, provided the agencies' ratings carry sufficient weight in the capital market.
In principle, securities with lower credit enhancements can be discounted by the market. In practice, however, the market has trusted agencies to be prudent in the determination of credit support requirements and has not required higher yields from issuers that have switched to agencies with lower enhancement requirements (Bruskin [ 19941) .
The evolution of credit rating standards and the emergence of market competition have been particularly dramatic in the case of private-label mortgagebacked securities. Until the mid-1980s, Standard & Poor's was the only agency rating these securities, and its required credit enhancements for reaching target ratings represented the industry standard.
In 1986, Moody's entered the market with criteria that were slightly different. While its standards are stricter than those of Standard & Poor's in some areas, Moody's set lower enhancement requirements for certain types of mortgage pools (shorter-term, negative amortization, and convertible adjustable-rate mortgages) and subsequently gained market share in those areas.
In Schultz [1994] and Inside Mortgage Securities [1994a . Clearly, MBS credit enhancement levels have declined over the history of the market. Analysts and agencies note that this in part reflects a progression along the learning curve; more information has become available over time about the performance of such securities, reducing the degree of uncertainty.
Skeptics remark that competitive pressures can lead to increased pressures to review standards. Whether or not agencies compete on criteria, it does appear that the incentive to innovate in structured finance ratings tends to favor lower enhancement levels.
V CONCLUSION
Regulators, like investors, value the cost savings achieved through the use of ratings in the credit evaluation process. As a result, they have come to employ a variety of specific letter ratings as thresholds for determining capital charges and defining investment prohibitions.
Although the agencies make no such assurances, the current use of ratings in regulation assumes a stable relationship between ratings and default probabilities. The historical record suggests otherwise. Although ratings usefully order credit risks at any 'particular time, specific letter ratings corresponded to higher default risks in the 1980s than in the 1970s.
The increasing number of agenci'es also poses problems for the existing structure of ratings-based regulation. Some agencies appear to have different absolute scales, rating bonds higher or lower on average than other agencies. And even normal variation in opinion across agencies with the same basic scales confounds the application of existing regulations. These problems multiply as the number of agencies and the differences of opinion among them increase.
The impact of multiple rating agencies and ratings differences is apparent in the case studies of junk bond, bank debt, and mortgage-backed securities ratings. For junk bonds, the availability of third opinions enables many borrowers to climb out of the speculative-grade zone into investment-grade territory. In the area of bank debt ratings, differences of opinion are particularly great between agencies of different countries and imply that the designation of more foreign agencies as NRSROs will allow more foreign banks to achieve higher ratings. Regardmg private-label mortgagebacked securities, intenslfylng competition among the four major agencies has been associated with downward revisions of required enhancement levels.
The Securities and Exchange Commission [1994a, 1994bl is reconsidering its procedures for designating nationally recognized agencies (NRSROs), the role of ratings in regulation, and the degree of public oversight and mandatory ratings disclosure. Questions for which comments have been solicited include:
What are the proper objective criteria to consider when determining NRSRO status? Is it appropriate for NRSROs to charge issuers for ratings, and in particular, to vary the charge with the size of the transaction? Would further regulatory oversight of NRSROs be appropriate, and what type of oversight would that be? Should issuers be required to disclose activities such as rating shopping -soliciting preliminary indications from numerous rating agencies in order to identify the agency that will provide the highest rating? The SEC's questions all raise the possibility of additional oversight or disclosure of NRSRO activity and the ratings process. Such measures could conceivably address some of the issues we have raised, by improving the intertemporal stability of default rates within ratings category and by reducing differences among the officially designated agencies. Of course, any changes in policy would entail complex trade-offs; specific proposals and their implications will surely be explored in future research.
The SEC has also invited comment on whether it should continue to employ an NRSRO concept. Although dropping the designation of NRSROs would be a rahcal measure, it might encourage regulators to revise their current use of ratings and to adjust for ratings differences across time and agency.
Ratings can and do play an important and valuable role in the functioning and oversight of financial markets. But regulators and investors alike should be critical users, and regularly review their application of ratings to the decisions they make. [1985] show that the market views Moody's and Standard & Poor's ratings as equivalent because the yields on bond issues with split ratings do not depend on which agency assigns the higher rating.
I5The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient, which can range fiom -1.00 to a maximum value of 1.00, measures the extent to which rank-orderings agree while removing any confounding effects of differences in average rating scores and differences in units of measurement.
I6These agencies acknowledge that their ratings are hlgher than Moody's and Standard & Poor's on average; they attribute some of the ratings hfference to sample selection bias. They argue that ratings from Fitch or Duff & Phelps are sought only when there is a strong expectation of improving upon Moody's and Standard & Poor's ratings. When Fitch or Duff & Phelps might, in fact, rate lower, their ratings are not purchased.
" F O~ example, u.S. issuers of commercial paper and long-term securities often obtain bank letters of credlt in order to achieve targeted credit ratings, but the attractiveness of such backing depends greatly on the credit rating of the bank issuing the letter of credit. When Standard & Poor's put three Japanese banks on its Creditwatch list, (with negative implications) in March 1994, the bond issues of 144 U.S. bond issuers and 46 U.S. commercial paper issues that were backed by letters of credit from these banks were also put on Creditwatch.
'*The ratings of the French rating agency S&P-ADEF, a joint venture founded in 1990 by Standard & Poor's and Agence d'Evaluation Financidre, are counted as Standard & Poor's ratings for the purposes of calculating global market share. The Financial Times may underestimate the market share of some rating agencies that publish ratings of only selected bank holdmg company subsiiliaries.
19The one consistent exception i s1 IBCA, which shows more agreement with Moody's on these measures for banks than does the wider sample. This finding may reflect IBCA's initial specialization in the rating 05 financial institutions and the limitation of its NRSRO designation to that area.
20The mean of the Pearson product-moment correlation for ratings of agencies from the same country is 0.858, compared with a mean of 0.775 for the correlation coefficients for the ratings of agencies from dfferent countries. The standard errors of measurement for the two coefficients are 0.018 and 0.054, respectively. 21We follow industry practice in using "assetbacked securities'' (ABS) in the more narrow sense that excludes mortgage-backed securities (MBS) .
22See Bruskin [1988 , 19941, Schultz [1994 , and Inside Mortgage Securities [1994a, 1994bl . Our discussion of the evolution of ratings criteria for MBS draws heavily from these sources.
